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AN ENEMY OF FREEDOM: UNITED STATES V.
JAMES J. SMITH AND THE ASSAULT ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
I. INTRODUCTION
Much has been written about the changes in our society's
approach to law enforcement in the wake of the events of September
11, 2001.1 Media and scholarly journals have discussed at length
amendments to existing statutes, such as the Classified Information
Procedures Act ("CIPA"),2 and completely new statutory schemes,
1. E.g., William C. Banks, And the Wall Came Tumbling Down: Secret
Surveillance After the Terror, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1147, (2003); John E.
Branch III, Statutory Misinterpretation: The Foreign Intelligence Court of
Review's Interpretation of the "Significant Purpose" Requirement of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 81 N.C. L. REV. 2075, (2003); David
Hardin, The Fuss over Two Small Words: The Unconstitutionality of the USA
Patriot Act Amendments to FISA Under the Fourth Amendment, 71 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 291 (2003); Nathan C. Henderson, The Patriot Act's Impact on
the Government's Ability to Conduct Electronic Surveillance of Ongoing
Domestic Communications, 52 DUKE L.J. 179 (2002); David S. Jonas, The
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Through the Lens of the 9/11
Commission Report: The Wisdom of the Patriot Act Amendments and the
Decision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, 27 N.C.
CENT. L.J. 95, (2005); Craig S. Lerner, The USA Patriot Act: Promoting the
Cooperation of Foreign Intelligence Gathering and Law Enforcement, 11 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 493 (2003); Michael P. O'Connor & Celia Rumann, Going,
Going, Gone: Sealing the Fate of the Fourth Amendment, 26 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 1234 (2003); Paul Rosenzweig, Civil Liberty and the Response to
Terrorism, 42 DUQ. L. REV. 663 (2004); Jeremy C. Smith, The USA PATRIOT
Act: Violating Reasonable Expectations of Privacy Protected by the Fourth
Amendment Without Advancing National Security, 82 N.C. L. REV. 412,
(2003); George P. Varghese, A Sense of Purpose: The Role of Law
Enforcement in Foreign Intelligence Surveillance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 385,
(2003).
2. Act of Oct. 15, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-456 (providing certain pretrial,
trial, and appellate procedures for criminal cases involving classified
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such as the USA Patriot Act ("Patriot Act").3 Names like Hamdi,
Padilla, and Moussaoui have appeared in cases that have bounced
back and forth through the federal courts. These cases have tested
the constitutional rights of defendants under these amended and new
statutory schemes.4
However, few Americans understand the breadth of the laws that
give the U.S. government an avenue to secretly invade every aspect
of their lives. Through a secret court known as the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC"), the government may apply
ex parte for permission to tap our phones, read our mail and e-mail,
track our cars, place microphones in our homes and cars, view our
library records and financial information, and follow us wherever we
go. And, it is extraordinarily easy for the government to get
permission to do so.
While the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ("FISA") 5 was
originally passed into law as a protection against abuses by the
federal government against its own citizens, 6 the federal government
has relied heavily upon FISA to spy on its own citizens in hopes of
gaining information to use in criminal prosecutions. In order to
understand how the government uses a statutory scheme originally
designed to protect U.S. citizens from warrantless surveillance to
now spy on U.S. citizens during a current criminal investigation, this
article examines the changes the Patriot Act made to FISA, and in
particular, how the newly revised statutes can be used in a specific
criminal investigation. Additionally, specific court documents and
motions relating to FISA prosecutions will detail what the Patriot
Act's changes to FISA mean for defendants subject to surveillance
under these statutes.
A perfect case to examine the nuances of FISA is United States
v. James Jay Smith.7 Using the surveillance techniques granted to
information).
3. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA Patriot Act) of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-56 (2001).
4. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542
U.S. 426 (2004); United States v. Moussaoui, 33 F.3d 509 (2003).
5. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1871 (2005).
6. See infra p. 36.
7. United States v. James J. Smith, No. CR 03-428-FMC (C.D. Cal. Apr.
1396
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them under a FISA warrant, in April 2002, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation ("FBI") arrested and indicted James Jay Smith
("Smith"), a U.S. citizen. Smith is a United States Army veteran of
the Vietnam War and a thirty-year veteran of the FBI. He was
arrested on charges of gross negligence in the handling of classified
documents. 8 At the outset, it should be noted that the author is
directly related to James Smith, and his communications were also
monitored during Smith's FISA surveillance. He attempts to remain
as unbiased as possible in the discussion of this case and of FISA.
This note uses United States v. James Jay Smith to demonstrate
the potential abuses of the FISC and of FISA. In particular, it
details: (1) the history of the case using publicly available court
documents, court transcripts, and newspaper articles; (2) the
available investigative techniques under FISA that were used in
Smith; (3) the potential abuses of FISA; (4) the recent developments
in domestic surveillance; and (5) the ways in which the laws could be
modified to deal directly with privacy and abuse concerns.
The potential for FISA and Fourth Amendment abuses are
staggering. The scales favor the government from the outset of the
FISA application process. For example, in order to receive FISC
authorization to conduct invasive surveillance and monitoring of a
subject, the government only needs to meet an extremely low
standard during its ex parte proceeding. 9 Additionally, because the
Patriot Act broadened the scope of FISA surveillance, the
government can argue more easily for the eligibility of potential
subjects. 10 Those subjects are never told that they, members of their
families, or friends will also be monitored under FISA surveillance."
Limiting the breadth of surveillance would require constant attention
by FBI agents. FISA surveillance easily can pick up and record calls
made by people who are not under investigation, including privileged
conversations, such as attorney-client or spousal communications.
1 2
Also, the government need not have foreign intelligence as the
primary reason for its investigation. The FISC still will approve the
8, 2003).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 793(f) (2005); see also id.
9. See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a) (2005).
10. See infra Part III.B. 1.
11. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1806(c), 1825(d).
12. See infra Part 1II.B.6.
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government's application for surveillance even if the government's
primary focus is a criminal investigation.' 3 When the investigation
reaches trial, unless the government intends to use FISA surveillance
information in a criminal proceeding, the government need not
disclose that the targeted individual was a FISA surveillance
subject. 14 And, even if the government does intend to offer the
information as evidence, because the FISA warrant is classified, it is
not easily subject to constitutional review by defense attorneys.'
5
Even if all parties have the necessary security clearances, the
government argues strenuously against disclosure of FISA affidavits
and applications. As a result, massive surveillance of a subject is
rarely, if ever, tested in an open proceeding in a court of law. Abuses
will not be discovered, and multiple violations of a defendant's rights
can occur without any remedy.
Although the potential for abuse is enormous, a simple solution
exists to ensure the rights of defendants subject to surveillance under
the auspices of FISA. This paper proposes that Congress ban all ex
parte applications to the FISC except in times of emergency and
create a division of the Federal Public Defender's Office with the
sole purpose of ensuring that adequate probable cause exists to issue
a FISA warrant against a U.S. citizen.
II. THE HISTORY OF UNITED STATES V. JAMES JAY SMITH
AND UNITED STATES. V. KATRINA LEUNG
When Smith and Katrina Leung ("Leung") were arrested, the
media produced sensationalized headlines, the FBI produced
ferocious press releases, and the media portrayed the zeal with which
the U.S. Attorney's Office decided to prosecute the case.' 6 The FBI
Director stated Smith "betrayed his country," and the FBI was quick
to use Smith to show that it could police its own agents and prevent
wrongdoing.' 7 The U.S. Attorney's Office did not spare the public
the more salacious details of Smith's conduct over the past twenty
years in its affidavits and indictments, including a long-term affair
13. See infra pp. 68-70.
14. See infra pp. 31, 42.
15. See infra p. 70.
16. Greg Krikorian, David Rosenzweig & K. Connie Kang, Ex-FBI Agent
Is Arrested in China Espionage Case, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2003, at B 1.
17. Id.
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with Leung. 18 Smith and Leung were depicted as intense threats to
national security, and the U.S. Attorney's Office promised a
thorough and diligent prosecution to determine how much damage
had been done to national security as a result of their conduct. 19
As a result of the FBI and U.S. Attorney's Office's zeal to
protect national security, both agencies repeatedly violated both
defendants' rights throughout the investigation.
A. Background and Overview
On April 8, 2003, Special Agent Randall Thomas of the Los
Angeles Division of the FBI gave sworn testimony that would form
the necessary support to arrest Smith and search his home.
20
Smith began his FBI career in Salt Lake City, Utah in October
1970.21 In 1971, Smith was transferred to the FBI's Los Angeles
Division. In July 1978, Smith was assigned to a Foreign
Counterintelligence ("FCI") Squad focusing on the People's
Republic of China ("PRC"), where he worked until his retirement in
November 2000.23 Smith was the Acting Supervisor of the FCI
China Squad from March 1983 through October 1983, and was also a
Relief Supervisor throughout the 1990s.2 4  He also became the
Supervisory Special Agent ("SSA") of the squad in 1996 until his
retirement.25  As a supervisor, Smith had access to classified
materials as both an agent and as a supervisory agent.26
In the probable cause section of the affidavit, Agent Thomas
detailed the activities of Katrina Leung, an FBI "asset" providing
information about the PRC from the early 1980s until 2002.27 Smith
was the FBI agent who recruited her and was her primary handler
18. Indictment, United States v. James J. Smith, No. CR-03-429-M (C.D.
Cal. May 7, 2003).
19. Krikorian, Rosenzweig & Kang, supra note 16.
20. Complaint for Violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 793(f),
United States v. James J. Smith, No. CR 03-428-FMC (C.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2003)
[hereinafter Smith Complaint].
21. Id. at 7.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 8.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 3.
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until he retired from the FBI in November 2000.28 Agent Thomas
declared that Smith would debrief Leung at her residence and, on
occasion, would take classified documents along and leave them
unattended in his unlocked briefcase.29 Agent Thomas stated that
Leung surreptitiously photocopied some of these documents without
Smith's knowledge, and that the FBI had obtained some of these
documents from Leung's home.
30
In addition, Agent Thomas revealed that the FBI investigation
uncovered evidence that a sexual relationship between Smith and
Leung began in the early 1980s and lasted until December 2002. 3'
Agent Thomas also asserted that Smith learned in 1991 that Leung
was providing classified information to PRC intelligence services
without FBI authorization.
32
1. Timeline of the Investigation
Beginning in April of 2002, Smith was subject to surveillance
under the auspices of FISA.3  The FISC's warrant allowed FBI
agents to engage in covert physical searches of Smith's home, to
wiretap, intercept, and record telephone and fax communications,
and to intercept email.34 In addition, the investigation also included
physical surveillance that did not require the FISC's authorization.
35
On November 5, 2002, Agent Thomas participated in a FISC-
authorized electronic surveillance of Smith and Leung having sexual
relations in a Los Angeles hotel.36
On November 11, 2002, Agent Thomas participated in a FISA-
authorized covert search of Leung's luggage at Los Angeles
International Airport ("LAX") prior to her departure for the PRC.37
Agents found a facsimile cover sheet from Smith to Leung.38 The
28. Id. at 8.
29. Id. at 3.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 9.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 17.
37. Id. at 16.
38. Id.
1400
ENEMY OF FREEDOM
second page included six photos from an October 2002 meeting of
the Society of Former Special Agents of the FBI, including photos of
active-duty agents. 39  On November 25, 2002, Agent Thomas
engaged in another FISA-authorized covert search of Leung's
luggage at LAX when she returned from the PRC.40 The photos
were not in her luggage.4'
On December 11, 2002, Assistant Section Chief ("ASC") Bruce
Carlson interviewed Leung at her residence.42 During that interview,
Leung voluntarily provided ASC Carlson with certain items she and
Smith had discussed earlier that day.43 Leung voluntarily removed a
document from her bedroom safe and provided it to ASC Carlson.44
Leung admitted that she obtained the document from Smith without
his knowledge approximately twelve years earlier.45 The document
was an excerpt or transcript of a conversation between Leung and her
Chinese "handler."
46
The day after that, Agent Thomas participated in a limited
consensual search of Leung's home, finding a Los Angeles FBI
telephone directory dated December 20, 1994, a telephone list of
agents assigned to a code-named FBI investigation, a classified FBI
memo regarding Chinese fugitives dated June 12, 1997, and a FBI
Legal Attach6 Directory dated March 17, 1994.
47
Four days later, upon review of classified documents in the Los
Angeles Secure Compartmented Information Facility ("SCIF"),
agents found that the transcript contained verbatim portions of
classified material.48  In interviews spanning December 11 to
December 17, 2002, Leung admitted to "sneak[ing]" the transcript
from Smith without his knowledge, and that although Smith
sometimes allowed her to review classified documents, he would not
39. Id.
40. Id. at 16-17.
41. Id. at 17.
42. Id. at 13.
43. Id. at 12.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 13-14.
48. Id. at 13.
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allow her to retain them.49 She also admitted to taking the telephone
directory and generally admitted to taking and copying documents
from Smith's open briefcase when he left it unattended.5 ° She also
admitted that she made handwritten notes of the copied files and
disposed of the copies. 51 Leung stated that she had also previously
made notes without copying documents from information Smith told
her.52 An interview between Leung and two FBI agents was also
cited where Leung admitted to her and Smith's sexual relationship,
beginning in the early 1980s.
53
A week later, Agent Thomas swore an affidavit before a federal
magistrate to apply for a warrant to search Leung's home and
business for evidence of violations of various bankruptcy statutes
and tax statutes.54 The federal magistrate granted the requests.55
The FBI's San Francisco Counterintelligence Division accessed
a top secret source who relayed the information found in both the top
secret document and the five-page transcript found in Leung's home
safe.56  When San Francisco SSA William Cleveland, Jr.
("Cleveland") listened to the audio recording provided by the source,
he recognized the voice on the tape as Leung's. 57 Cleveland notified
Smith of the unauthorized contact with the Ministry of State Security
("MSS"). 58 Smith traveled to San Francisco, telling Cleveland that
he had no knowledge of Leung's unauthorized communications with
the MSS. 59 Cleveland stated that he relied upon Smith as Leung's
handler to appropriately address the problem, and before his next
meeting with Smith and Leung, he asked Smith if the unauthorized
communications had been addressed. 60 Smith assured Cleveland that
49. Id. 14-15.
50. Id. at 15.
51. Id. at 15-16.
52. Id. at 16.
53. Id. at 10.
54. Id. at 9-10.
55. Id. at 10.
56. Id. at 20.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 20. The MSS is an intelligence service of the PRC, conducting
intelligence operations focusing on the United States intelligence community.
Id. at4.
59. Id. 20.
60. Id. at21.
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he had addressed the issue of the unauthorized communications.
6 1
2. The Search Warrant
The information detailed above provided probable cause to
obtain a warrant to investigate Smith's alleged violation of § 793(f)
62
(gross negligence in handling national defense information) and §§
1343 and 134663 (deprivation of the right to honest services and wire
fraud).64 Using the warrant, agents searched and seized specific
items from Smith's home. 65 Later, agents relied on the affidavit to
obtain a warrant to arrest Smith at his home on April 9, 2003. Smith
later pled not guilty.
66
B. The Legal Proceedings Timeline
Both Leung and Smith were arrested at their homes in the early
hours of April 9, 2003.67 Leung was charged with the more serious
crime of violating § 793(b), 6 8 the unauthorized access and willful
retention of documents relating to the national defense.
69
One month later, on May 7, 2003, the government detailed its
case against Smith in its first indictment. 70  Counts One through
Four, deprivation of honest services and wire fraud, alleged that
Smith deprived the FBI of his honest services when he: 1) had an
improper sexual relationship with Leung; 2) failed to report his
inappropriate relationship with Leung to the FBI; 3) failed to make
truthful and complete reports to the FBI concerning Leung's
unauthorized contacts with the PRC; 4) filed as well as caused other
agents to file reports which concealed and omitted negative
information about Leung; and 5) mishandled information relating to
61. Id.
62. 18 U.S.C. § 793(f) (2005).
63. Id. §§ 1343, 1346.
64. Smith Complaint, supra note 20, at 24.
65. Id. at 24-25.
66. Krikorian, Rosenzweig & Kang, supra note 16.
67. Id.
68. 18 U.S.C. § 793(b).
69. Complaint for violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 793(b),
United States v. Katrina Leung, No. 03-0729-M (C.D. Cal. Apr. 8, 2003), at
34.
70. Indictment, United States v. James J. Smith, No. CR 03-429-M (C.D.
Cal. May 7, 2003).
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the national defense and classified information.7'
The government alleged that the relationship "deprived
defendant Smith of the required objectivity in evaluating the ongoing
reliability of Katrina Leung." 72 The government also alleged that
when Smith submitted a required periodic asset evaluation, he did
not disclose the relationship, nor did he inform the FBI that Leung
refused to submit to a polygraph examination when it was learned
that Leung had unauthorized contact with an agent of the MSS.
73
The government alleged that, between 1991 and 2000, Smith did not
disclose this information despite nineteen separate asset evaluation
reports.74
Furthermore, the government alleged that on four separate
occasions from September 22, 1998 to March 20, 2000, Smith sent
his asset evaluations from the Los Angeles office to FBI
headquarters in Washington, D.C. via wire transmissions, thereby
violating the wire fraud statute.75  Count Five alleged gross
negligence in the handling of classified documents.76
One day after Smith's indictment, Leung was indicted on five
separate counts relating to her unauthorized copying and retention of
classified documents.77  Count One, unauthorized copying of
national defense information with reason to believe that it will injure
the United States or benefit a foreign nation, alleged that Leung took
and copied a document connected with national defense. The
document was a memo that detailed a classified off-site location
related to a previous FBI investigation.78 Count Two alleged the
authorized taking and copying of a "SECRET" document.79 Counts
Three through Five alleged the unauthorized possession and failure
to return three separate documents: 1) the five-page transcript, 2) the
memo regarding the past FBI investigation and classified offsite
71. Id. at 8.
72. Id. at 9.
73. Id. at 11, 12.
74. Id. at 11.
75. Id. at 11, 13-15.
76. Id. at 16.
77. Indictment, United States v. Katrina Leung, No. CR 03-434 (C.D. Cal.
May 8, 2003).
78. Id. at 1-2.
79. Id. at 3.
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location, and 3) the "SECRET" memo.80
Smith's lawyers filed a motion on November 26, 2003, detailing
the classified documents they would be requesting to view in order to
mount their defense under CIPA. 81 The motion consisted of thirty-
two redacted pages before a single paragraph of text could be seen.
The paragraph of text, however, referred only to intercepted cellular
phone calls that cast no doubt on Leung's reliability and bona fides.
82
The remainder of the document was redacted. Presumably, 83 the
document listed the specific pieces of classified evidence that
Smith's attorneys would offer in his defense as well as the grounds
for their admission under CIPA and the Federal Rules of Evidence
("FRE").
Foreshadowing the conclusion of the case, on December 17,
2003, government lawyers argued a motion that would have
prohibited the two defense teams to speak to each other regarding
documents that had already been disclosed to both sides.84 Assistant
U.S. Attorney ("AUSA") Emmick stated in court, "Smith knows
everything. Smith knows all the secrets and has been
communicating with his counsel for months." 85 Leung's attorney,
Janet Levine ("Levine"), was "disparaged and insulted" by
Emmick's statements. "We are not asking to go into Mr. Smith's
head in any way, shape or form. All we are asking is to discuss with
Mr. Smith's counsel discovery that both sides have received from the
government. This is information that we are using to defend our
client." 86 Judge Cooper agreed with Levine, granting the motion to
80. Id. at 4-5.
81. Defendant's First Notice Under § 5 Of The Classified Information
Procedures Act, United States v. James J. Smith, No. CR 03-429-FMC (C.D.
Cal. Nov. 26, 2003). Because the documents dealing with classified
information (CIPA and FISA motions) were recently released to the public in
redacted format, there will be gaps in the substance of these motions.
82. Id. at 33.
83. The author only has access to the redacted, unclassified versions of the
recently released documents. All conjectures as to the redacted content of the
motions or arguments of the attorneys are speculative and are not based on
citable facts.
84. Linda Deutsch, Lawyers Argue Motion About Discussing Documents in
Spy Case, VENTURA COUNTY STAR, Dec. 18, 2003, at Al.
85. Id.
86. Id.
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allow discussion of information already disclosed to both parties. 87
On the same day, Smith's lawyers filed a motion to compel
production of FISC applications, orders, and related documents.
88
Smith's lawyers argued that the government had to produce the FISC
applications for the following reasons. First, the surveillance
conducted under FISA was not minimized, as required by FISA.89
Thus, surveillance included privileged conversations between Smith
and counsel, between Smith and his wife, and dozens of
conversations and emails that were unrelated to the case or to foreign
intelligence generally.90 Second, the government asserted that, as a
U.S. citizen,91 Smith was "an agent of a foreign power" 92 who
"knowingly engage[d] in clandestine intelligence gathering activities
for or on behalf of a foreign power."93 The government has yet to
produce, however, any evidence of Smith knowingly collecting
information for a foreign power. Finally, because of this lack of
evidence, the FISC application contained "intentional or reckless
material falsehoods or omissions."
94
Smith's lawyers filed another, more detailed, FISA-related
motion on January 28, 2004.95 In addition to restating many of the
87. Id.
88. Notice of Motion and Motion of Defendant James J. Smith to Compel
Production of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Applications, Orders, and
Related Documents, and Memorandum in Support, United States v. James J.
Smith, No. CR 03-429-FMC (C.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2003) [hereinafter Motion to
Compel].
89. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h) (2005) (defining minimization procedures for
electronic surveillance); 50 U.S.C. § 1821(4) (defining minimization
procedures for physical searches).
90. Motion to Compel, supra note 88, at 1-2.
91. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(i) (2005).
92. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(1).
93. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(a).
94. Motion to Compel, supra note 88, at 8. For timeline purposes, the
content of the FISA-related motions will be cursory only. The bulk of the
FISA history and application to this specific case study will be discussed at
length in Section III.
95. Notice of Motion and Motion of Defendant James J. Smith to Suppress
Evidence Obtained or Derived from Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
Surveillance, Memorandum in Support, and Declaration of John D. Cline,
United States v. James J. Smith, No. CR 03-429-FMC (C.D. Cal. Jan. 28,
2004) [hereinafter Motion to Suppress].
1406
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original FISA motion's arguments, Smith's lawyers argued that
FISA, on its face and as applied, violated the Fourth Amendment
following the enactment of 2001 Patriot Act amendments.
96
Additionally, Smith argued that the "Fourth Amendment [r]equires a
[t]raditional [w]arrant [s]upported by [c]riminal [p]robable [c]ause
[u]nless the '[p]rimary [p]urpose' of the [s]urveillance is the
[c]ollection of [floreign [i]ntelligence." 97 Further, Smith argued that
"[t]he Supreme Court's '[s]pecial [n]eeds' [c]ases [d]emonstrate that
the FISA '[s]ignificant [p]urpose' [p]rovision [v]iolates the Fourth
Amendment."
98
In an additional motion,99 Smith argued that any evidence
obtained through FISA-related surveillance of Leung should be
suppressed for many of the same reasons contained in the first
January 28, 2004 motion. Smith argued that he was also an
"aggrieved person"' 00 for FISA purposes since communications
between he and Leung were intercepted during the Leung FISA
surveillance and during FISA searches of Leung's home. Thus Smith
had standing10 to challenge the FISA surveillance and physical
searches of Leung.' 
02
Following Smith's motions, the government shifted its focus and
narrowed its case, issuing a superseding indictment against Smith on
February 24, 2004. Count One alleged violation of 18 U.S.C. §§
1341, 1346 (mail fraud/deprivation of honest services). 0 3 Instead of
alleging, as before, that Smith sent his periodic asset evaluations via
wire, the new indictment alleged that Smith delivered via mail the
96. Id. at 8-11.
97. Id. at 11.
98. Id. at 20.
99. Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion of Defendant James
J. Smith to Suppress Evidence Obtained or Derived from Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act Surveillance, United States v. James J. Smith, No. CR-03-
429-FMC (C.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2004).
100. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(k) (2005); 50 U.S.C. § 1821(2).
101. United States v. Belfield, 692 F.2d 141, 146 n.21 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(finding that a person incidentally overheard during FISA surveillance of
another target is an "aggrieved person").
102. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1806(e)-(g), 1825(f)-(h) (defining proper methods for
challenging surveillance and physical searches undertaken pursuant to FISA).
103. First Superseding Indictment at 9, United States v. James J. Smith, No.
CR 03-429(A)-FMC (C.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2004).
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results of an official security investigation 10 4 where Los Angeles FBI
officials asked Smith, while not under oath, if he was aware of any
current or past circumstances in his life which could have a bearing
on his suitability for employment.
10 5
Count Two also contained a new charge, a violation of 18
U.S.C. § 1001 (false statement to a federal agency). 10 6 Allegedly,
Smith failed to disclose his improper sexual relationship with Leung
to the interviewing agent.10 7 Counts Three and Four remained the
same, alleging violations of 18 U.S.C. § 793(f). The indictment,
however, now included two counts of gross negligence against
Smith. ' 0'
The next day, on February 25, 2005, the government argued a
motion filed a month earlier that surprisingly abdicated any right it
may have had to introduce any evidence gained from the FISA
searches and wiretaps of Smith.10 9
Smith filed additional FISA-related motions to address the new
charges against him on April 12, 2004.'1 ° The first motion objected
to the government's responses to the original FISA-related defense
motions regarding information gained from the Leung surveillance
and searches."' The government filed two responses, one ex parte
and classified, and one unclassified and shared with the defense.'
12
The unclassified response did not address the intercepted attorney-
client privileged communications between Smith and his lawyer.
113
The arguments contained in the motion were substantially the same
104. Id.
105. Id. at 14.
106. Id. at 15.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 16-17.
109. Government's Response to Defendant's Motion to Compel Production
of FISA Applications, Orders, and Related Documents, United States v. James
J. Smith, No. CR 03-429-FMC (C.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2004).
110. Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion of Defendant James J. Smith
to Suppress Evidence Obtained or Derived from Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act Surveillance, United States v. James J. Smith, No. CR 03-
429-FMC (C.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2004) [hereinafter Reply in Support of Motion to
Suppress].
111. Id. at 1.
112. Id.
113. Id.
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as previous FISA-related motions.
Smith's second motion stated that the government had
intercepted fifty-three privileged attorney-client conversations
among Smith and his lawyers. 1 4  The government's purported
protection of the attorney-client privilege was to have the calls
retained, reviewed and transcribed by a "taint team" rather than by
the "investigative team."" 5  However, eight of the privileged
conversations were produced to the "investigative team" and to
Leung's defense team.
' 1 6
Ultimately, the FISA questions were never decided. On May 12,
2004, Smith entered into a plea agreement with the government."
7
In exchange for dropping all other counts and providing extensive
cooperation, Smith agreed to plead guilty to one count of 18 U.S.C. §
1001 (false statement to a federal agency)." 18 It was speculated that,
for his cooperation, Smith would serve no prison time even though
he faced a maximum sentence of five years in federal prison."
9
Consequently, media outlets began to question the seriousness of the
cases against Leung and Smith. "[F]ederal authorities have tried to
lower expectations in the case since Smith and Leung's highly
publicized arrests last year."' 120 "[T]he FBI's investigation and other
national security checks turned up no hard evidence that secrets had
been compromised on a scale comparable to other recent espionage
scandals-most notably ... Robert Hanssen."' 21 "[T]he message is
clear that putting this agent in jail was not a priority for the
government . .. and the outcome does seem contrary to the stated
objective of the Justice Department of ferreting out corruption."'
' 22
Incredibly, in Smith's plea agreement,' 23 the government
114. Id.
115. Id. at2.
116. Id.
117. Greg Krikorian, Handler of Alleged Spy Cuts Plea Deal, L.A. TIMES,
May 12, 2004, at B 1.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Greg Krikorian, Ex-FBI Agent Pleads to a Lesser Charge in Spy Case,
L.A. TIMES, May 13, 2004, at B1.
121. Id.
122. Id. (statement of Myles H. Malman, former federal prosecutor).
123. Plea Agreement for Defendant James J. Smith, United States v. James J.
Smith, No. CR 03-429(A)-FMC (C.D. Cal. May 12, 2004).
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mandated that Smith must not have any further contact with Leung
or her counsel regarding any aspect of the continuing prosecution
against Leung. 124
Due to this highly unusual prohibition of not speaking with the
only witness that could help exonerate Leung, attorneys for Leung
made a motion on November 18, 2004, that asked Judge Cooper to
dismiss all charges against Leung due to the illegal and unethical
clauses contained within Smith's plea agreement.1 25 Quickly, AUSA
Lonergan sent a letter to Smith's attorneys explaining that the "no
further sharing" clause was intended to limit defense counsel-to-
counsel discussions, not to limit Smith's right to consent or decline
to an interview with Leung's counsel.
126
The media quickly got wind of the letter. 27 At the motion
hearing on December 9, 2004, AUSA Emmick defended the plea
agreement, calling the language "inartful," creating a possible
mistaken impression that Smith could not talk to Leung's lawyers.1
28
In a tersely worded order filed January 6, 2005, Judge Cooper
dismissed all charges against Leung. 129  Judge Cooper openly
criticized the government, reminding them that the government "may
not interfere with defense access to witnesses." 130 The government
argued that the language in the plea agreement was ambiguous, that
it never intended to restrict Smith's freedom to talk to Leung's
defense counsel, and that the government cured any potential
problem by explaining via a letter to Smith's attorneys that there was
no restriction imposed.13 ' The government's arguments were not
persuasive to Judge Cooper.
132
124. Id. at 7.
125. David Rosenzweig, Lawyers for Alleged Spy Accuse Prosecution of
Misconduct, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2004, at B 1.
126. Memorandum from Rebecca Lonergan re: United States v. James
Smith, United States v. Katrina Leung (Nov. 24, 2004) (on file with author).
127. Gene Maddaus, Ex-agent OK'd to Talk in Spy Case, PASADENA STAR-
NEWS, Nov. 30, 2004, at Al.
128. David Rosenzweig, Alleged Spy's Lawyers Ask Dismissal of Case, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 12, 2004, at B 1.
129. Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 12, United States v.
Katrina Leung, No. CR 03-434 FMC (C.D. Cal. January 6, 2005).
130. Id. at2.
131. Id. at3.
132. Id. at 3-7.
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Judge Cooper concluded that the prosecution had "engaged in
willful and deliberate misconduct, depriving defendant of her right of
access to a critical witness in her defense,"' 33 and that "[d]eliberate
misconduct which rises to the level of a due process violation
warrants dismissal of criminal charges if it results in substantial
prejudice to the defendant."' 34 In addition, Judge Cooper considered
the effect that the plea agreement had on Smith, recognizing the fact
that Smith faced five serious felony charges, and the possible
sentence of many years in federal prison and the loss of his federal
pension.' 35 She also stated that she believed that, but for the
government prohibition against contact with Leung's counsel, Smith
would have consented to an interview with her defense counsel. 1
36
Judge Cooper found that Leung suffered substantial prejudice,
stating:
[T]he witness is critical to the defense; the witness has
everything to lose by defying the government's wishes with
respect to Ms. Leung's case; the admonition against talking
to the defense was not just an instruction from the
prosecutor, but was made a condition of what the defense
has accurately described as his 'sweetheart deal.' 1
37
Judge Cooper dismissed all charges, stating that any lesser
remedy would not right the harm done, and that the government
"engaged in a pattern of stone-walling entirely unbecoming of a
prosecuting agency."'
' 38
133. Id. at 7.
134. Id. at 8.
135. Id. at 9-10.
136. Id. at 9-10.
137. Id. at 10.
138. Id. at 12. U.S. Attorney Debra W. Yang ("Yang") issued a statement
saying, "I stand behind the work of the prosecutors in this case and I know that
they have conducted themselves ethically." She reserved the right not to
comment on any possible appeal. David Rosenzweig, Spying Case Tossed
Out, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2005, at B10. The government quickly filed a motion
for reconsideration on February 4, 2005. Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of Motion for Reconsideration of Order Granting
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, United States v. Katrina Leung, No. CR 03-
434-FMC (C.D. Cal. filed Feb. 4, 2005). The government, in unusually blunt
language, denied any misrepresentations to the court, again reiterating that the
Wallace e-mail did not apply to the "no further sharing" clause and that Leung
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Judge Cooper continued to disagree with the government. On
March 23, 2004, she affirmed her order for dismissal, rejecting the
contention that she failed to consider material facts and stating that
she considered them, but ultimately disagreed with them.' 
39
On July 18, 2005, AUSA Lonergan argued for a two-month
prison term for Smith, stating that Smith seriously endangered
national security. 14 Lonergan also complained that Smith could not
answer specific questions asked of him during his one hundred hours
of interrogation post-plea bargain.' 4 1  While acknowledging that
Smith's lack of memory may have been "genuine," Lonergan stated
that intelligence agents would spend many years assessing the
damage. 142 Defense counsel Brian Sun countered the allegations,
accusing the government of "backdooring" the national security issue
into the case when the plea agreement contained no such
admission. 4 3 Sun stated that the "case ha[d] been largely driven by
politics, image, Washington and saving face for all concerned.'
44
Sun also argued that Smith cooperated fully and to the best of his
ability, stating that Smith was asked questions about events that had
taken place over twenty years prior.1 45  Ultimately, Smith was
sentenced to three months of unmonitored house arrest, a $10,000
fine, and a three-year probationary sentence.1
46
On December 16, 2005, even though the government had an
did not suffer substantial prejudice since Smith was allowed to talk to Leung's
counsel. Id. at 2-3. Incredibly, the motion stated that AUSA Emmick did not
draft the plea agreement, and that the "inartful" language was submitted after
consultation with management at the U.S. Attorney's Office and attorneys with
the Department of Justice. Id. at 4. Also, the government chastised the court
for revealing in camera documents (namely, the Wallace and Emmick emails),
stating that it should have had the opportunity to contest the disclosure. Id. at
21-22.
139. Greg Krikorian, Dismissal of Spy Case is Reaffirmed, L.A. TIMES, Mar.
24, 2005, at B6.
140. David Rosenzweig, Former FBI Agent Given Probation, L.A. TIMES,
July 19, 2005, at B3.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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appeal pending before the Ninth Circuit arguing that Leung's
dismissal was premature and unwarranted, the government accepted
Leung's plea to two counts: making false statements to FBI agents
and filing a bogus tax return in 2000.147 In exchange, the
government terminated all investigations against her.148  Judge
Cooper sentenced Leung to three years' probation, one hundred
hours of community service, participation in FBI debriefings and a
$10,000 fine. 
149
The sensational case against Smith and Leung ended, not with a
flashy trial with lurid details of an affair and shocking disclosures of
breaches of national security, but with plea bargains to the least
serious crimes included in their indictments. The high-profile press
conferences were conspicuously absent. The pride in the
investigation and prosecution of Smith and Leung that the FBI and
U.S. Attorney's Offices were so eager to show the world was gone.
The government's case had failed to produce substantial convictions,
and, in the end, the government got exactly what it needed in the first
place-cooperation from the two defendants in the case to determine
the damage, if any, to national security. In the wake of the
government's failure, the relationships of the families and colleagues
of Smith and Leung were forever changed. Their rights were
trampled by a government determined to protect its national security
interests. There appears to be no remedy for those abuses.
III. THE INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES
AND STATUTORY SUPPORT UNDER FISA
150
What lessons can one take away from the prosecution of Smith
and Leung? What does the outcome of these two cases mean for
future subjects of FISA surveillance? In order to answer these
questions, this article takes a closer look at the underlying statutes
that give the government the awesome power to subject U.S. citizens
to surveillance without producing a warrant that can be tested in an
147. David Rosenzweig, Judge OKs Plea Deal in Spy Case, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 17, 2005, at B3.
148. Stan Wilson, Accused Double Agent Pleads to Tax Charge, CNN, Dec.
16, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/12/16/spy.compromise/index.html.
149. Id.
150. This section relies heavily on the Smith pleadings and motions for
structure and content. Where appropriate, direct quotations have been made.
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open court of law.
A. FISA History and Procedures
"FISA was enacted in 1978 to establish procedures for the use of
electronic surveillance in gathering foreign intelligence information
.... The Act was intended to strike 'a sound balance between the
need for such surveillance and the protection of civil liberties. ' ' 151
FISA creates FISC to which the government must apply for an order
authorizing electronic monitoring
152 or a physical search. 153
First, the statute requires that FISC applications be approved by
the Attorney General and contain certain information and
certifications. 154 The application must contain "a statement of the
facts and circumstances relied upon by the applicant to justify his
belief that ... the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign
power or an agent of a foreign power."'' 55 An "agent of a foreign
power," as applied to a "United States person"' 56 means "any person
who ... knowingly engages in clandestine intelligence gathering
activities for or on behalf of a foreign power;"'' 57 "any person who[,]
... pursuant to the direction of an intelligence service or network of
a foreign power, knowingly engages in any other clandestine
intelligence activities for or on behalf of such foreign power;"'' 58 and
"any person who ... knowingly aids or abets any person in the
conduct of activities'159 described above.
Second, the application to FISC must provide a "statement of
the proposed minimization procedures."' 60 The statute specifies the
requirements for these procedures with respect to both electronic
surveillance 161 and physical searches. 162 Third, the application must
151. In re Kevork, 788 F.2d 566, 569 (9th Cir. 1986).
152. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1803, 1804 (2005).
153. Id. § 1823.
154. Id. § 1804 (electronic monitoring); id. § 1823 (physical search).
155. Id. § 1804(a)(4)-(a)(4)(A) (same requirement for a physical search).
156. Id. § 1801(i).
157. Id. § 1801(b)(2)-(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added).
158. Id. § 1801(b)(2)-(b)(2)(B) (emphasis added).
159. Id. § 1801 (b)(2)-(b)(2)(E) (emphasis added).
160. Id. § 1804(a)(5); see id. § 1823(a)(5) (same requirement for physical
searches).
161. Id. § 1804(a)(5).
162. Id. § 1821(4).
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contain certain "certifications" by an appropriate executive branch
official. 163 Among other things, the official must certify "that a
significant purpose of the surveillance is to obtain foreign
intelligence information"'1 64 and "that such information cannot
reasonably be obtained by normal investigative techniques."'65
Fourth, the statute specifies what findings FISC must make
before it can approve electronic monitoring
1 66 or a physical search.1 67
FISC must find that the procedural requirements are satisfied,
68
including the minimization requirements, and that there is "probable
cause to believe that ... the target of the electronic surveillance is a
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power."169 When the target of
the surveillance is a "United States person," FISC must determine
that the government's certifications under § 1804 "are not clearly
erroneous." 
17 0
Fifth, FISA provides that "[n]o otherwise privileged
communication obtained in accordance with, or in violation of, the
provisions of this subchapter shall lose its privileged character.' 17'
Sixth, FISA authorizes any "aggrieved person" to "move to
suppress the evidence obtained or derived from such electronic
surveillance on the grounds that ... the information was unlawfully
acquired [or] the surveillance was not made in conformity with an
order of authorization or approval. 172
FISA defines the phrase "aggrieved person" as "a person who is
the target of an electronic surveillance or any other person whose
communications or activities were subject to electronic
163. Id. § 1804(a)(7).
164. Id. § 1804(a)(7)(B); see id. § 1823(a)(7)(B) (same requirements for
physical searches).
165. Id. § 1804(a)(7)(C); see id. § 1823(a)(7)(C) (same requirements for
physical searches) (emphasis added).
166. Id. § 1805.
167. Id. § 1824.
168. Id. §§ 1805(a)(1), (2), (4).
169. Id. § 1805(a)(3)-(a)(3)(A); see id. § 1824(a)(3)-(a)(3)(A) (similar
requirements for a physical search) (emphasis added).
170. Id. § 1805(a)(5); see id. § 1824(a)(5) (similar requirement for a physical
search).
171. Id. § 1806(a).
172. Id. § 1806(e)-(e)(2); see id. § 1825(e) (similar provision for physical
searches).
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surveillance."' 173 An "aggrieved person" for purposes of a physical
search "means a person whose premises, property, information, or
material is the target of physical search or any other person whose
premises, property, information, or material was subject to physical
search."
174
Lastly, § 1806(f) provides that, "if the Attorney General files an
affidavit under oath that disclosure or an adversary hearing would
harm the national security of the United States," the court deciding
the motion must consider the application and order for electronic
surveillance in camera to determine whether the surveillance was
lawfully conducted. 7 5 "In making this determination, the court may
disclose to the aggrieved person, under appropriate security
procedures and protective orders, portions of the application, order,
or other materials relating to the surveillance only where such
disclosure is necessary to make an accurate determination of the
legality of the surveillance."'
76
B. Abuses of FISA in the Smith Case
1. Traditional Probable Cause and the Amended FISA Requirements
"[FISA] is not to be used as an end-rn around the Fourth
Amendment's prohibition of warrantless searches.' ' 177 Courts have
interpreted the Fourth Amendment as prohibiting the government
from conducting electronic surveillance or physically searching a
home or other private place without first demonstrating criminal
probable cause, where "'the evidence sought will aid in a particular
apprehension or conviction' for a particular offense' ' 178 In contrast,
173. Id. § 1801(k).
174. Id. § 1821(2).
175. Id. § 1806(f).
176. Id.
177. United States v. Johnson, 952 F.2d 565, 572 (1st Cir. 1991); United
States v. Badia, 827 F.2d 1458, 1464 (1 1th Cir. 1987) (FISA application and
related documents "establish that the telephone surveillance of Arocena did not
have as its purpose the primary objective of investigating a criminal act").
178. Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 255 (1979) (quoting Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307 (1967)) (holding that the legislature intended to
confer power to engage in covert entries under Title III upon a showing of
probable cause); see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2518(1)(b), 3(a); United States v. Meling, 47
F.3d 1546, 1551 (9th Cir. 1995) (finding that an affidavit for Title III warrant
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FISA does not require a showing of criminal probable cause.
1 7 9
Instead, the government must only show probable cause that the
target is an "agent of a foreign power."'1 80 The Patriot Act amended
FISA's requirement that an executive branch official certify that "the
purpose" of the proposed surveillance was foreign intelligence
gathering. 181 As amended, foreign intelligence gathering need only
be "a significant purpose" of the surveillance.' 82 As a result, FISA
offers less protection than the traditional Fourth Amendment
protections under Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe
Streets Act of 1968.183
Under Title III and the Fourth Amendment, the target of the
surveillance must receive notice that the government has invaded his
privacy. 84 Under FISA, the government does not have to provide
notice to the target unless it "intends to enter into evidence or
otherwise use or disclose" the FISA evidence in a trial or other
official proceeding. 185  In contrast, a target under Title III
surveillance may receive copies of the application and order to
challenge the constitutionality of the surveillance.'
1 86
2. Disclosure of the FISA Applications
and Orders and an "Agent of a Foreign Power"
According to the legislative history of FISA, disclosure may be
necessary under § 1806(f) in cases where compliance with
minimization standards and general questions of legality undermine
the validity of the surveillance. For example, disclosure may be
necessary "where the court's initial review of the application, order,
and fruits of the surveillance indicates that the question of legality
may be complicated by factors such as 'indications of possible
misrepresentation of fact, vague identification of the persons to be
contained sufficient probable cause).
179. Motion to Suppress, supra note 95, at 8.
180. Id.
181. Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 218, 115 Stat. 291 (codified at 50
U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(7)(B), 1805(a)(5), 1823(a)(7)(B), 1824(a)(5) (2005).
182. Id.
183. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 (2005).
184. Id. § 2518(8)(d).
185. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1806(c), 1825(d) (2005).
186. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(9).
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surveilled, or surveillance records which include a significant
amount of non-foreign intelligence information, calling into question
compliance with the minimization standards contained in the
order. "",1
8 7
In Smith's case, to obtain the FISC orders, the government had
to convince FISC that probable cause existed showing that Smith
was "an agent of a foreign power."' 188 Smith could only have been an
"agent of a foreign power" if he "knowingly" assisted Leung's
alleged clandestine intelligence activities on behalf of the PRC.'89
Interestingly, neither of the indictments against Smith alleges that
Smith "knowingly" assisted Leung. In fact, the indictments only
charge Smith with gross negligence in the handling of classified
information. Gross negligence does not require that the defendant's
conduct be "knowing."' 90 Therefore, it is possible that despite the
government's allegations that Smith is an "agent of a foreign power,"
which formed the probable cause upon which FISC issued its orders,
the FISC applications contained falsehoods or omissions that were
material to and properly influenced FISC's issuance of the orders.'
9 1
However, because the government never disclosed to Smith's
counsel the FISC application, Smith's counsel was unable to
187. United States v. Belfield, 692 F.2d 141, 147 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (quoting
S. REP. No. 701, at 64 (1978)); see United States v. Ott, 827 F.2d 473, 476 (9th
Cir. 1987) (finding that if monitoring agents choose to disregard the
minimization standards and thereby acquire evidence of a crime against an
overheard party whose conversation properly should have been minimized,
that evidence would be acquired in violation of this chapter and would
properly be suppressed); see also United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 77 n.6
(2d Cir. 1984) (holding that to be entitled to a hearing on the validity of the
FISA order, the target must make a substantial preliminary showing that a false
statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth,
was included in the application and that the allegedly false statement was
"necessary" to the FISA Judge's approval of the application).
188. See supra note 168 and accompanying text; see also Motion to
Suppress, supra note 91, at 8.
189. See 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b) (2005) (defining "agent of a foreign power" as
requiring knowing action).
190. 18 U.S.C. § 793(f) (2005).
191. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978) (establishing the
circumstances under which the target of a search may obtain an evidentiary
hearing concerning the veracity of the information contained in a search
warrant affidavit); Duggan, 743 F.2d at 77 n.6.
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conclusively test whether there was adequate probable cause that
Smith was an "agent of a foreign power." Nevertheless, Smith's
counsel attempted to argue that probable cause did not exist.
Smith's counsel identified at least three large categories that
potentially contained material omissions: (1) information supporting
Leung's reliability, bona fides, and loyalty to the United States; (2)
information about Smith that would materially undercut the
government's contention that he knowingly aided and abetted the
PRC's clandestine intelligence activities; and (3) information casting
doubt on the credibility of informants on whom the government may
have relied in the FISA applications.
192
The motion has seven redacted pages that follow this citation.
Presumably, Smith's counsel cited specific instances of each of its
three contentions. If defense counsel had information that would
have shown that Smith was not an "agent of a foreign power," it
would have wanted to ensure that FISC, and in turn, Judge Cooper,
evaluated the evidence in Smith's favor.
3. Failed Minimization Procedures
In addition, the "surveillance records" produced to Smith's
lawyers 193 "include[d] a significant amount of non-foreign
intelligence information, calling into question compliance with the
minimization standards contained in the order."1 94  "The
overwhelming majority of the intercepted Smith phone calls and e-
mails have no conceivable bearing on foreign intelligence."'
195
The blanket FISA surveillance affected Smith's family as well.
"The communications also include a large number of telephone calls
that do not involve or relate to Smith-conversations by his wife and
son, for example-that have no bearing at all on this case."'
9 6
"[B]etween April 2002 and April 2003 the government intercepted
... approximately 19,315 total calls to and from Smith's home
telephone .... [W]e estimate that fewer than 200 of the calls-about
1% of the total.., could conceivably contain foreign intelligence
192. Motion to Suppress, supra note 95, at 28.
193. Motion to Compel, supra note 88, at 11-12.
194. Belfield, 692 F.2d at 147 (quoting S. Rep. No. 701, at 64 (1978)).
195. Motion to Compel, supra note 88, at 12.
196. Motion to Suppress, supra note 95, at 38.
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information or evidence of a crime." 197
4. Deficient Certifications to FISC
The government's certifications to FISC may have also been
deficient or erroneous. First, "the government presumably certified
that 'a significant purpose'. . of the surveillance was 'to obtain
foreign intelligence information....' Because it appears that the
government had begun a criminal investigation of Smith well before
the FISA surveillance began, there is reason to believe that the
surveillance served an overwhelmingly criminal purpose during all
or most of its existence."'
' 98
If the government had asked for a FISA warrant primarily to
assist in a criminal investigation that coincidentally had foreign
intelligence overtones, then they violated the requirements of FISA.
"Second, the government was required to certify that the foreign
intelligence information 'cannot reasonably be obtained by normal
investigative techniques,' and to provide a 'statement of the basis for
the certification.' 199 "In the discovery provided to date, we have
seen little indication that the government attempted to use 'normal
investigative techniques' before resorting to the highly intrusive,
blanket surveillance of Smith's cell phone, home phone, fax
machine, and e-mail, and to covert physical searches."
200
5. The Government's Classified
Responses and Concern for National Security
In response, the government asked the court to review the
materials ex parte, which carries a notoriously significant "risk of an
erroneous deprivation" of the liberty and property interests at issue.
"Additional.. .procedural safeguards," such as access to the FISA
materials and an opportunity to address them, carry substantial
"probable value."20°
The Supreme Court has declared that "fairness can rarely be
197. Id. at 40-41.
198. Id. at 36 (quoting 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B) (2005)).
199. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1804(a)(7)(E), 1823(a)(7)(E); Motion to Suppress, supra
note 95, at 36-37.
200. Id. at 37.
201. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (three-factor test to
determine if due process requires requested disclosure).
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obtained by secret, one-sided determination of facts decisive of rights
.... No better instrument has been devised for arriving at truth than
to give a person in jeopardy of serious loss notice of the case against
him and opportunity to meet it.", °2 The Ninth Circuit, in a secret
evidence case, observed "[o]ne would be hard pressed to design a
procedure more likely to result in erroneous deprivations ... [T]he
very foundation of the adversary process assumes that use of
undisclosed information will violate due process because of the risk
of error."
203
Similarly, in Franks v. Delaware,20 4 the Court held that "a
defendant must be permitted to attack the veracity of the affidavit
underlying a search warrant, upon a preliminary showing of an
intentional or reckless material falsehood.,
20 5
The usual reliance of our legal system on adversary
proceedings itself should be an indication that an ex parte
inquiry is likely to be less vigorous .... The pre-search
proceeding will frequently be marked by haste, because of
the understandable desire to act before the evidence
disappears; this urgency will not always permit the
magistrate to make an extended independent examination of
the affiant or other witnesses.
20 6
As FISC itself has acknowledged, without adversarial
proceedings, systematic executive branch misconduct, including
submission of FISC applications with "erroneous statements" and
"omissions of material facts," goes entirely undetected by the courts
until the DOJ chooses to reveal it. 20 7 In recognition of this problem,
"[o]ne FBI agent was barred [subsequently] from appearing before
202. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 55
(1993) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123,
170-72 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
203. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. v. Reno, 70 F.3d 1045,
1069 (9th Cir. 1995) (internal quotation marks omitted).
204. 438 U.S. 154 (1978).
205. Motion to Compel, supra note 88, at 15 (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438
U.S. 154, 169 (1978)).
206. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 169 (1978).
207. See In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 620-21 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct.
2002), abrogated by In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Ct. of Review 2002).
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the Court as a FISA affiant.
' 20 8
6. Interception of Privileged
Communications with Smith's Attorneys and Wife
Beginning on December 10, 2002, when Smith contacted Brian
Sun, Smith's lead attorney of record, by cell phone during his
interrogation by the FBI, the government intercepted approximately
eleven attorney-client communications. At the beginning of one
such call, on December 12, 2002, Sun specifically noted that the
communication was privileged. In some calls, Smith and Sun
discussed the details of Smith's legal strategy.
20 9
The extent of the government's intrusion into defense counsel's
conversations was not yet revealed. On March 24, 2004, Smith's
counsel had identified fifty-three folders containing privileged
communications between Smith and his attorney, Sun and/or
Murphy. 2 10 The law has historically regarded attorney-client
communications as essential to the vitality of the American judicial
process. 2 11 "The privilege is intended to encourage 'full and frank
communication between attorneys and their clients and thereby
promote broader public interests in the observance of law and the
administration of justice.' ' 212 The government's interception of the
attorney-client communications between Smith and Sun was
inexcusable.
Purportedly, the government implemented measures to guard
against the wholesale disregard of the privilege. The government's
approach was to submit these calls to review by a "taint team" rather
than by the "investigative team., 21 3  Nevertheless, eight of the
conversations were produced to the investigative team and Leung's
counsel.214 Upon hearing these conversations, the government may
208. Id. at 621.
209. Motion to Suppress, supra note 95, at 43.
210. Paul Murphy was an associate attorney in Sun's firm. Reply in Support
of Motion to suppress, supra note 110 at 1.
211. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
212. Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 403 (1998) (quoting
Upjohn Co., 449 U.S. at 389) (addressing attorney's notes of an interview with
a deceased client; holding that they were protected by the attorney-client
privilege).
213. See Reply in Support of Motion to Suppress, supra note 110 at 2.
214. Id.
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have adjusted their approach to the investigation and to the
prosecution, gaining an advantage against Smith while at the same
time impeding his ability to mount an effective defense.
In addition, the indictment could have been dismissed due to the
government's misconduct. The court considered four factors when
determining whether intrusion into the attorney-client privilege
violates the Constitution, thus requiring dismissal of an
indictment:
2' 5
(1) whether evidence to be used at trial was obtained
directly or indirectly by the government intrusion; (2)
whether the intrusion was intentional; (3) whether the
prosecution received otherwise confidential information
about trial preparation or defense strategy as a result of the
intrusion; and (4) whether the privileged information was
used or will be used to the substantial detriment of the
defendant .... 216
If the previously discussed FISA motions were factually correct,
all four factors would have been met. The first, third, and fourth
factors would be satisfied if the government learned details about
Smith's conduct or planned defense through his conversations with
his attorneys that led it to additional investigative avenues.
Furthermore, the invasion of the attorney-client privilege would
qualify as intentional if the government did not comply with the
minimization procedures required under FISA. Thus, the second
factor would also be met.
In addition to intercepting attorney-client communications, the
government disregarded another essential privilege-spousal
communications. "The FISA surveillance of Smith intercepted, and
recorded, without minimizing numerous telephone conversations
between Smith and his wife. 217 It is not known what the substance
of these conversations was, however, they were privileged and could
215. See United States v. Neill, 952 F. Supp. 834, 840 (D.D.C. 1997).
216. Supplemental Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion of Defendant
James J. Smith to Suppress Evidence Obtained or Derived from Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act Surveillance of Attomey-Client Privileged
Communications at 2-3, United States v. James J. Smith, No. CR-03-429-FMC
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 19, 2004) (quoting United States v. Neill, 952 F. Supp. 834,
840 (D.D.C. 1997)).
217. Motion to Suppress, supra note 95, at 45.
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not be offered as evidence.218
7. The Outcome
The foregoing discussion demonstrates the absence of reason or
basis in fact supporting the FISA warrant. And yet, FISC approved
the warrant nonetheless. 219 Since the CIPA motions that Smith's
counsel produced were all redacted when released to the public, no
one can determine whether the FISC applications omitted or
misrepresented classified information that would have shown Smith
was not in fact an "agent of a foreign power." However, had the
government included information in the FISC applications showing
Smith was acting as an "agent of a foreign power" and had the
resulting FISA surveillance uncovered additional evidence of
"knowing" action by Smith, one can only wonder why the
government did not charge Smith with a more egregious violation
than gross negligence.
The indictment against Smith alleged that Leung surreptitiously
took documents from Smith's unlocked briefcase and copied them.
220
So, why did the government abandon its argument that Smith was an
"agent of a foreign power" who knowingly assisted Leung in her
efforts, to adopt the position that Smith was guilty of no more than
gross negligence? There is no evidence that the government applied
for a Title III warrant of Smith at the beginning of the investigation.
Nor is there any evidence that the government had a source who
tipped them off to the possibility of Leung's and Smith's
misconduct. If there was in fact an informant who led the
government to open an investigation, then Smith was denied the
opportunity to test the informant's reliability under the Aguilar-
218. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47-53 (1980); see also In
re Grand Jury Investigation, 745 F.2d 863, 864 (9th Cir. 1985); In re Grand
Jury Investigation, 603 F.2d 786, 787-88 (9th Cir. 1979).
219. Notice of Motion and Motion of Defendant James J. Smith to Suppress
Evidence Obtained or Derived From Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
Surveillance, Memorandum in Support, and Declaration of John D. Cline at 1,
United States v. James J. Smith, No. CR 03-429-FMC, (C.D. Cal. January 28,
2004).
220. First Superseding Indictment at 16-17, United States v. James J. Smith,
No. CR 03-429(A)-FMC (C.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2004).
1424
ENEMY OF FREEDOM
Spinelli line of cases221 and their progeny, such as Illinois v. Gates.222
In addition to the shortcomings of the system to protect the
rights of targets of surveillance, FISA offers a convenient means of
circumventing the traditional Title III and search warrant
processes. 223 Under FISA, the executive's certification concerning
the purpose of the surveillance or search is only subject to minimal
scrutiny by the courts. "The FISA Judge, in reviewing the
application, is not to second-guess the executive branch official's
certification that the objective of the surveillance is foreign
intelligence information." 224 Even subsequent ex parte review of the
FISA Judge's determination adds little protection for the defendant,
considering that the "reviewing court is to have no greater authority
to second-guess the executive branch's certifications than has a FISA
Judge."
225
According to the Attorney General's annual reports, from 1979
to 2002 FISC approved 15,256 applications or extensions authorizing
FISA surveillance or searches. On four occasions it modified an
application before granting approval, and only on one occasion did
221. Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) (search violated Fourth
Amendment since the affidavit did not contain a sufficient basis for probable
cause, such as information that the unidentified informant spoke with personal
knowledge of the facts or any informant for the unidentified source's belief);
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969) (probable cause not supportable
on an informant's tip alone, because the affidavit did not set forth reasons for
informant's reliability or personal knowledge).
222. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
223. See generally Kelly R. Cusick, Thwarting Ideological Terrorism: Are
We Brave Enough to Maintain Civil Liberties in the Face of Terrorist Induced
Trauma?, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 55 (2003) (discussing Title II of the
USA Patriot Act and how it violates American civil liberties); Joshua L.
Dratel, Ethical Issues in Defending a Terrorism Case: How Secrecy and
Security Impair the Defense of a Terrorism Case, 2 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y &
ETHICS J. 81 (2003) (addressing the unique issues faced by attorneys defending
those faced with terrorism charges); Grayson A. Hoffman, Litigating
Terrorism: The New FISA Regime, the Wall, and the Fourth Amendment, 40
AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1655 (2003) (discussing why a comparison of FISA Title
III procedures are problematic).
224. United States v. Duggan, 743 F.2d 59, 77 (2d Cir. 1984); see In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 347 F.3d 197, 204-205 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing
Duggan as authority).
225. Duggan, 743 F.2d at 77.
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FISC deny the application. 226  Basic division shows that FISC
approved an average of almost three applications per day over the
1979 to 2002 period.227
The trend is only increasing. In 2003, the Justice Department
applied for a record 1,754 FISA warrants, 228 or on average, almost
seven warrants a day.
229
No more than once has FISC rejected an application. Nor has
any district court suppressed the results of a FISA surveillance or
search.230 Nor has any appeals court reversed a decision where the
district court denied a motion to suppress FISA information.23 '
The underwhelming number of occasions in which FISC
actually rejected FISA warrant applications suggests that the rights
of the targets of the surveillance are not adequately considered. The
deck is stacked against the target from the beginning of the process,
and the Fourth Amendment becomes an afterthought in the
proceedings. There is no meaningful standard of review guiding
FISC, the district court, or defense counsel.
The government responds to these critiques by citing the usual
generalized interest in avoiding damage to "national security."
However the government makes no effort to demonstrate that
disclosure of FISA materials would cause such damage.
226. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, http://fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa
(last visited Apr. 6, 2006).
227. Assuming that the FISC sits for all five weekdays of the 52 weeks a
year to consider applications, this means that there are 260 days a year in
which the FISC can sit and consider applications. The period in question
covers 23 years. Therefore, the FISC sat for 5980 days over the period from
1979 to 2002. If there were 15,264 applications divided by 5980 days total,
then the FISC considered almost three applications a day. The number is
likely much higher when you consider federal holidays, vacations, and a likely
three or four day work-week.
228. Devlin Barrett, Wiretaps in U.S. Jump in 19 Percent in 2004,
Associated Press, Apr. 28, 2005; Richard Schmitt, Covert Searches Are
Increasing Under Patriot Act, L.A. TIMES, May 2, 2004, at A29.
229. Assuming 260 days in which the FISC can sit and consider applications,
1,754 total applications divided by 260 days a year equals 6.75 warrants, or
almost seven a day.
230. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, supra note 226.
231. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Ct.
of Review 2002).
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Specifically, in the Smith case, the government merely stated that
"[d]efense counsel have Top Secret/SCI security clearances and an
obvious 'need to know' the information. Smith himself, as the
government has repeatedly acknowledged, possesses an
extraordinary range of classified information," without
demonstrating how disclosing the FISA material would affect
national security.232  Thus, the Smith case illustrated that the
government's argument that further disclosure of FISA materials
would harm national security is tenuous at best.
The Smith case would have been the perfect case to test the
limits of the FISA statutes. Everyone involved with the case was
cleared to view the applications and orders, and there would have
been no risk to national security. The court could have conducted an
in camera review and revealed the review only to Smith, his lawyers,
and government counsel. Smith had already been arrested and
presumably, since classified information was involved, was under
strict pre-trial protective orders not to discuss the case with anyone.
If he exposed any of the FISA information or methods, he could have
easily been rearrested and charged with intentional exposure of
classified material. If appealed, the case would have gone to the
Ninth Circuit, and, regardless of the outcome, it could have been
appealed to the Supreme Court, which appears to be uneasy with the
abandonment of the Fourth Amendment and its protections.233
IV. BROADER DEVELOPMENTS IN
DOMESTIC SPYING TECHNIQUES AND AUTHORITY
"[I]t appears that the only way to make [FISC] more convenient
would be to install a drive-through window." 234 To people familiar
with the Smith case, problems with balancing defendants' rights with
the government's interest in protecting national security are no
surprise. However, the government's zeal to protect national
security does not merely extend to the FISA context. The
government has gone farther than ever before in its quest to protect
232. Motion to Compel, supra note 88, at 20.
233. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 123
(1993) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S.
123, 170-72 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
234. Tim Rutten, Paranoia on the Left and the Right, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 24,
2005, at El.
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Americans from terrorism. In an extension of the techniques and
abilities granted under the Patriot Act's revision of the FISA
235statutes, the government created a secret National Security Agency
("NSA") domestic spying program that was revealed in late 2005.236
The NSA is a super secret monitoring agency whose mission is
to spy on communications abroad.237 On December 16, 2005, after
withholding a story for an entire year due to security concerns, the
New York Times published an article revealing that President Bush
authorized the NSA to monitor the international phone calls and
emails of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of people inside the United
States, all without warrants.238 The Times stated that some NSA
officials were so concerned about the validity of the program that
they refused to participate. 239 The Times also stated that most people
235. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools
Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56
(2001).
236. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without
Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2005, at Al. Details of the program are sketchy
at best. However, the Times reported that when the Central Intelligence
Agency ("CIA") began capturing Al Qaeda operatives overseas, agents seized
the terrorists' computers, cell phones and personal phone directories. Id. This
information was sent to the NSA and, during their monitoring of the original
numbers and email addresses, it also monitored others linked to them, creating
an expanding chain. Id. Hundreds of these numbers and addresses were
located in the United States. Id. However, in order to target the recipients of
the messages in the United States, the government previously had to first
obtain a court order from the FISC. Id. In addition, the FBI is traditionally
responsible for the application to the FISC, not the NSA. Id.
237. Traditionally, the NSA can target phone calls or emails on foreign soil,
even if the recipient of those messages is in the United States. Id.
238. Id. Additionally, new disclosures stemming from an American Civil
Liberties Union ("ACLU") FOIA lawsuit alleging improper FBI surveillance
of protest and social groups show that the FBI was monitoring, among others,
an Indianapolis "Vegan Community Project," Greenpeace, the Catholic
Workers' for exhibiting a "semi-communistic ideology," and a People for the
Ethical Treatment of Animals ("PETA") protest over the use of llama fur. Eric
Lichtblau, F.B.I. Watched Activist Groups, New Files Show, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
20, 2005, at Al. The FBI argued that their monitoring was driven by evidence
of criminal or violent activity at public protests or disruptive activities. Id.
239. Id. In opposition to the program, the federal judge who oversees the
FISC, Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly, helped spur a temporary suspension of
certain aspects of the program in mid-2004. Id. She questioned whether
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targeted under the NSA program have never been charged with a
crime.
240
Additional facts regarding the government's surveillance of U.S.
targets continue to come to light. The Pentagon's newest
counterintelligence agency, the Counterintelligence Field Activity
("CIFA"), grew from a coordinating agency between the military and
the Pentagon to an analytical and operational organization in just
under three years. 24 Included in the agency's activities is the
''surveillance of potentially threatening people or organizations
inside the United States. 242  A former senior counterterrorism
official has referred to CIFA as the "militarization of
counterterrorism."
243
In a surprising move, on December 21, 2005, one of FISC's
judges, U.S. District Judge James Robertson, resigned from his
position in protest over President Bush's surveillance program,
stating that the NSA program is legally questionable and may have
tainted FISC's work. 24  In addition, Judge Robertson expressed
concern that information gathered under President Bush's
warrantless surveillance program could have been used to obtain
FISC warrants.245
Continuing the call for disclosure, on December 22, 2005,
presiding FISC Judge Colleen Kollar-Kotelly arranged for a
classified briefing for FISC to address FISC's concern about the
legality of President Bush's domestic spying program.246  Judge
information gathered under the NSA program was being improperly used as
the basis for FISA wiretap requests from the Justice Department. Id. As a
result, she insisted that any material gathered under the NSA program not be
used in seeking wiretap warrants from her court. Id. To date, her question has
not been answered and it is not clear whether her request has been honored. Id.
240. Id.
241. Walter Pincus, Pentagon's Intelligence Authority Widens, WASH. POST,
Dec. 19, 2005, at A10.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Carol D. Leonnig & Dafna Linzer, Spy Court Judge Quits In Protest,
WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2005, at Al.
245. Federal Judge Quits Foreign-Intelligence Court; A critic of tactics in
the war on terrorism, he was reportedly troubled by reports that citizens were
being monitored without warrants, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2005, at A30.
246. Carol D. Leonnig & Dafna Linzer, Judges on Surveillance Court To Be
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Kollar-Kotelly expects top-ranking officials from the NSA and the
DOJ to outline the details of the program to FISC.247 The judges
could also demand that the officials prove that FISC warrants were
not tainted by information gathered through President Bush's
program.248 In addition, a judge stated that members of the FISC
could disband the court in light of President Bush's assertion that he
can bypass FISC.
249
On another front, defense lawyers in prominent terror cases plan
to bring legal challenges to determine whether the NSA used illegal
wiretaps against several dozen Muslim men tied to Al-Qaeda.25 ° The
expected legal challenges will center on the question of whether the
defendants in these cases were in fact monitored under the NSA
program and whether the government withheld critical information
or misled judges and defense lawyers about how and why the
defendants were singled out.251 Specifically, the Bush administration
has cited the NSA program as a "critical" part in at least two cases
that led to convictions of Al-Qaeda associates. The first case
involved lyman Faris of Ohio, who admitted in taking part in a failed
plot to destroy the Brooklyn Bridge. The second case involved
Mohammed Junaid Babar of Queens, New York, who was
252implicated in a plot to bomb British targets. The first expected
challenge is likely to come as early as January 2006 in the case of
two men charged with Jose Padilla,253 the dirty bomb suspect held
for three years without an indictment as his detention wound its way
through the courts.254 To date, lawyers for Smith and Leung have
not filed similar motions to discover whether information gained
from the NSA domestic spying program provided the factual basis
for the FISA surveillance conducted during the investigations.
Briefed on Spy Program, WASH. POST, Dec. 22, 2005, at Al.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Defense Lawyers in Terror Cases Plan
Challenges Over Spy Efforts, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2005, at Al.
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Eric Lichtblau, In Legal Shift, U.S. Charges Detainee in Terrorism
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2005, at Al.
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The first official lawsuits seeking to end the NSA spying
program were filed on January 17, 2006 in federal court.255  The
lawsuits, one filed in New York by the Center for Constitutional
rights256 and the other in Detroit by the ACLU,257 challenge the
program on the basis that it bypasses monitoring safeguards required
258by FISA. The lawsuits name President Bush, the head of the NSA
and the various heads of the other major security agencies as parties
to the lawsuit.
259
V. SUGGESTED CHANGES TO FISA
TO SECURE DEFENDANTS' RIGHTS
If it were enough to avoid the Fourth Amendment warrant and
probable cause requirements merely that an electronic surveillance or
physical search had some "significant" connection to foreign
intelligence, federal criminal investigators could use those highly
intrusive techniques for "virtually any purpose. 26 °
The FISA Court of Review conceded that the "constitutional
question presented by [U.S. v. Smith]-whether Congress'
disapproval of the primary purpose test is consistent with the Fourth
Amendment-has no definitive jurisprudential answer.
'"26 1
It is apparent that the government increasingly views FISA as
the cure-all to the annoyance of due process and Fourth Amendment
protections of traditional Title III warrants. Through FISA, the
government can easily obtain a secret warrant, allowing an invasion
of one's privacy that is almost entirely insulated from any
meaningful Fourth Amendment scrutiny or analysis.
255. Larry Neumeister, Groups File Lawsuit Over Eavesdropping Program,
Associated Press, Jan. 17, 2006.
256. See Complaint, Center for Constitutional Rights v. Bush, No. 06-CV-
00313 (S.D.N.Y. Jan 17, 2006).
257. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, American Civil
Liberties Union v. National Securitiy Agency, No. 2:06-CV-10204 (E.D. Mich.
Jan. 1, 2006).
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Motion to Suppress, supra note 95, at 23.
261. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 746 (Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Ct. of Review 2002). And yet, in spite of this startling admission, the Court of
Review upheld the constitutionality of the warrant without addressing the
murkiness of the Fourth Amendment question. See id.
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A. Congressional Oversight
According to the FISA statutes, the U.S. Senate's Select
Committee on Intelligence 262 and the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence 263 have jurisdiction over FISC and the
executive branch officials submitting FISA applications when the
Attorney General authorizes covert surveillance without a court
order. 264 A quick glance at the Senate Committee's hearings 265 of
the 109th Congress reveals that many of the hearings are closed to
the public for obvious national security reasons, making the concern
over public opinion against secret search and seizure warrants a moot
point. Senators on the committee can say that they give FISA
warrants the attention they deserve, while in reality, they accept the
testimony of government officials before the committee at face value
without further investigation.
266
The only requirements as to the content of the Attorney
General's report to the Committees are statistical in nature.267 The
263. U.S. Senate Committee on Intelligence-Jurisdiction
http://intelligence.senate.gov/juris.htm, (last visited Apr. 6, 2006) (emphasis
added).
263. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence: Home Page,
http://intelligence.house.gov/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 6, 2006).
264. 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(2) (2001) ("An electronic surveillance authorized
by this subsection may be conducted only in accordance with the Attorney
General's certification and the minimization procedures adopted by him. The
Attorney General shall assess compliance with such procedures and shall
report such assessments to the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence under the
provisions of section 1808(a) of this title.").
265. U.S. Senate Committee on Intelligence-Hearings,
http://intelligence.senate.gov/hrl09.htm (last visited Apr. 6, 2006).
266. See infra text accompanying note 265.
267. According to 50 U.S.C. § 1871(a):
On a semiannual basis, the Attorney General shall submit to the
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives, the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate,
and the Committees on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives
and the Senate, in a manner consistent with the protection of the
national security, a report setting forth with respect to the preceding 6-
month period-
(1) the aggregate number of persons targeted for orders issued under
this chapter...
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Attorney General need only give the Committee a brief description
of each case brought under FISA, and an indication of which cases
ultimately involved use of FISA evidence at trial.
As the Smith case demonstrates, when an executive branch
official applies for a FISA warrant against a U.S. citizen,268 the only
Executive Branch review comes from the Attorney General. But the
Attorney General is the person who ordered the FISA warrant in the
first place, and the Attorney General can only grant review upon
written request from specific executive branch individuals. 269  The
FBI Director, presumably after consultation with the DOJ and the
Attorney General, directs his officials to apply for a FISA warrant.
The FBI Director, after getting approval from the Attorney General,
is expected to review the same FISA warrant and ask the Attorney
General to review it for any mistakes. It is safe to say that neither the
Attorney General nor the FBI Director will review the FISA warrant
once it has been secured from the FISC. None of the other three
executive officials listed in the statute270 would know what the FBI
and DOJ investigations entailed, so their written requests would not
likely be forthcoming.
The protections from within the Executive and Legislative
Branches are weak, if not toothless. The author understands the need
to protect national security. Furthermore, the author agrees that
opening the hearings in the House and Senate would expose to the
public information regarding intelligence gathering and targets of
surveillance. This would likely bring about the calamitous threat to
national security the government fears. We cannot have intelligence
information broadcast for all to hear, giving our nation's enemies
(3) the number of times that the Attorney General has authorized that
information obtained under this Act may be used in a criminal
proceeding or any information derived therefrom may be used in a
criminal proceeding ....
50 U.S.C. § 1871(a) (2005).
268. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b)(2)(A).
269. Id. § 1804(e)(1)(A) ("Upon written request of the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of
State, or the Director of National Intelligence, the Attorney General shall
personally review under subsection (a) of this section an application under that
subsection for a target described in section 1801 (b)(2) of this title.").
270. Namely, the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, or the Director of
National Intelligence. See id.
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additional ammunition in their fight against us.
However, the expectation that the Attorney General and other
executive branch officials will review every FISA application for
proper procedures is unrealistic and naive-especially after the FBI
Director and the DOJ confer over the need for a FISA warrant. They
cannot be expected to review almost two thousand applications a
year. Therefore, we cannot look to the Legislative or Executive
Branches for help. That leaves us with one Branch to turn to for aid:
the Judicial Branch.
B. Criminal and Civil Remedies
Under the FISA statutes, there are criminal sanctions that can be
brought against the agents conducting electronic surveillance and
physical searches.271 However, case law precludes a suit against the
Attorney General and FBI Agents acting at his behest.272 Citing a
271. 50 U.S.C. § 1809 (2005) provides:
(a) Prohibited activities
A person is guilty of an offense if he intentionally-
(1) engages in electronic surveillance under color of law except as
authorized by statute; or
(2) discloses or uses information obtained under color of law by
electronic surveillance, knowing or having reason to know that the
information was obtained through electronic surveillance not
authorized by statute.
(b) Defense
It is a defense to a prosecution under subsection (a) of this section
that the defendant was a law enforcement or investigative officer
engaged in the course of his official duties and the electronic
surveillance was authorized by and conducted pursuant to a search
warrant or court order of a court of competent jurisdiction.
(c) Penalties
An offense described in this section is punishable by a fine of not
more than $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than five years,
or both.
(d) Federal jurisdiction
There is Federal jurisdiction over an offense under this section if
the person committing the offense was an officer or employee of
the United States at the time the offense was committed.
50 U.S.C. § 1809; see § 1827 (physical searches).
272. Chagnon v. Bell, 642 F.2d 1248, 1251 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (appellants
arguing, among other claims, that the defendants did not have probable cause
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possibility of abuse if a remedy were granted,273 the Court in
Chagnon v. Bell denied relief to plaintiffs, stating that "the broad
authority of federal executive officials to direct their subordinates
carries with it the danger that such power will be abused ... ,274
The Court has further found that "FBI officers [are] entitled to act in
reliance on an official statement of the law by the Attorney General
of the United States. 275
However, an exception to this immunity exists. A public official
loses immunity if he knows or reasonably should know that an action
within his sphere of official responsibility "would violate the
constitutional rights of the [individual] affected .... ,,276 Immunity is
also inappropriate where the public official acts with the "malicious
intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other
injury ... ,,277
Next, "when a defendant interposes a good-faith defense to a
charge of official misconduct, the court must determine as a matter
of law whether the charge states a violation of a right that has been
authoritatively declared., 278 In Chagnon, the court hedged its bets,
stating that the state of the law in 1978-1979 was still unsettled, and
therefore, the claim of immunity should stand.279
However, in Zweibon I, the court stated:
to believe that the target of the wiretap was the agent of a foreign power, and
that this should overcome any assertion of immunity).
273. Id. at 1252.
274. Id. at 1255.
275. Id. at 1255 n.9.
276. Id. at 1257
277. Id.
278. Id. at 1258.
279. Id. ("Each of the alleged issues of material fact upon which appellants
relied in opposing summary judgment is in essence a claim that the Attorney
General 'knew or should have known' that the Truong surveillance violated
appellants' constitutional rights. As we have explained, absent malice, such a
claim defeats an immunity defense only in an area of 'clearly established' law.
Whether evaluated by reference to Supreme Court and other judicial precedent,
to presidential practice, or to then existing congressional legislation, the state
of the law with respect to electronic surveillance of foreign agents of foreign
powers was, at best, unsettled in 1977-1978, the period of the Truong
wiretap." (footnotes omitted)); see also id. at 1256. ("[It is plain that the
Supreme Court in Keith left unanswered the question whether a foreign agent
exception to the warrant requirement exists.").
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[A] warrant must be obtained before a wiretap is installed
on a domestic organization that is neither the agent of nor
acting in collaboration with a foreign power. Thus, read in
its broadest light, Zweibon I restricted the potential reach of
the foreign agent exception by explicitly eliminating from
its purview surveillance aimed at individuals or domestic
organizations not acting on behalf of a foreign power.
280
This could spell victory for Smith and others like him. As the
highest ranking law enforcement official in the federal government,
the Attorney General "must be held to know the relevant law."
28'
However, case law also makes such a claim extraordinarily hard to
prove.
[W]hen the foreign agent exception is invoked to justify
warrantless surveillance, courts must be alert to the possible
pretextuality of the claim. Here the good faith defense
based on a presumed foreign agent exception succeeds
because this record demonstrates a "direct link between the
wiretap target and a foreign interest as a justification for
surveillance' and because the surveillance was 'reasonably
intended to guard national security data from foreign
intelligence agencies.'
' 282
In Smith, both factors of the good faith defense fail. First, since
the affidavit against Smith only charged him with gross negligence,
there is serious reason to doubt that Smith was directly linked to a
foreign interest. Second, while the initial FISA application could be
reasonably viewed as an attempt to determine if national security
data was in fact passing from Smith to Leung, initial FISA
surveillance and interviews with Leung would have given the
investigators no indication that Smith was in fact knowingly passing
national security data to Leung on a continuous basis. In light of
these arguments, it is possible that Smith could defeat a claim of
immunity in the face of criminal charges by the Attorney General.
However, not all is well for Smith. FISA provides for an
280. Chagnon, 642 F.2d at 1259 (second emphasis added) (internal quotation
omitted).
281. Id. at 1257.
282. Id. at 1260 (quoting Halperin v. Kissinger, 606 F.2d 1192, 1204 (D.C.
Cir. 1979)).
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additional defense to the potential criminal charges.283 Since no one
has ever defeated the immunity that federal officers enjoy, no case
exists that tests the limits of the defense built into the statute.
However, by the plain text of the statute, it is clear that the Attorney
General, the FBI Director, and any FBI Agent involved with the
FISA surveillance can easily be defined as a "law enforcement or
investigative officer engaged in the course of his official duties. 284
Also, since "the electronic surveillance was authorized by and
conducted pursuant to a search warrant ... of a court of competent
jurisdiction, 285 namely FISC, every federal official who had a hand
in the FISA surveillance can rest easy. If arrested under the FISA
statute, they have a rock-solid defense. Smith has no recourse under
the criminal penalties section of FISA. No federal official will ever
be held judicially accountable for the likely abuses of Smith's Fourth
Amendment rights. Meanwhile, Smith remains convicted of a felony
punishable by up to five years in prison.286
Not surprisingly, the same result and its reasoning 287 apply to
the civil remedies sections of FISA.288 However, the statutes do not
283. 50 U.S.C. § 1809(b) (2005) ("It is a defense to a prosecution under
subsection (a) of this section that the defendant was a law enforcement or
investigative officer engaged in the course of his official duties and the
electronic surveillance was authorized by and conducted pursuant to a search
warrant or court order of a court of competent jurisdiction."); see id. § 1827(b).
284. 50 U.S.C. § 1809(b)
285. Id.
286. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2005) (stating the maximum sentence for making a
false statement to a federal agency).
287. See Chagnon, 642 F.2d 1248.
288. 50 U.S.C. § 1810 states:
An aggrieved person, other than a foreign power or an agent of a
foreign power, as defined in section 1801(a) or (b)(1)(A) ... ,
respectively, who has been subjected to an electronic surveillance or
about whom information obtained by electronic surveillance of such
person has been disclosed or used in violation of section 1809 ...
shall have a cause of action against any person who committed such
violation and shall be entitled to recover-
(a) actual damages, but not less than liquidated damages of $1,000
or $100 per day for each day of violation, whichever is greater;
(b) punitive damages; and
(c) reasonable attomey's fees and other investigation and
litigation costs reasonably incurred.
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include the defense provided in the criminal remedies section of
FISA. The government conceded that Smith was an "aggrieved
* 289person" in one of their motions, so Smith has overcome that
particular hurdle should he decide to sue. The remaining obstacle, is
the same issue that was before the Smith court: is Smith an "agent of
a foreign power" under FISA definitions?
290
This would require an examination of the underlying FISC
application, along with any evidence that tended to show Smith was
not an agent of a foreign power. Again, no court has ever mandated
disclosure of a FISA application. However, Smith and his counsel
are the perfect parties to break new legal ground. As discussed
above, all parties have the requisite security clearances. Moreover,
the government's only defense to a civil case under this statute is to
disclose the application and show that they had probable cause to
believe Smith was an "agent of a foreign power." Assuming Smith
can overcome a claim of immunity, the government would have no
choice but to disclose the application unless it chose to avoid
litigation through a settlement accepted by Smith.
Additionally, on the issue of damages, Smith stands to recoup
monetarily.29 1 Smith's case appears to be the perfect test case. Only
50 U.S.C. § 1810 (2005); see also id. § 1828 (stating the civil remedies for an
illegal FISA physical search).
289. Reply in Support of Motion of Defendant James J. Smith to Suppress
Evidence Obtained or Derived from Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
Surveillance, United States v. James J. Smith, No. CR-03-429-FMC (C.D. Cal.
Apr. 12, 2004).
290. 50 U.S.C. § 1804(a)(4)(A); see id. § 1823(a)(4)(A) (same requirement
for a physical search).
291. See 50 U.S.C. § 1810(a)-(c) (defining electronic surveillance damages);
see id. § 1828(1)-(3) (defining physical searches damages). Under 50 U.S.C. §
1810(a), assuming that Smith was surveilled every day for an entire year,
Smith can sue for $100 for each day he was under surveillance. That comes to
a total of $365,000. Now, under subsection (c), assume that Smith's two
attorneys conservatively charged an hourly rate of $350. Now, assume they
spent eight hours a day for 6 months' worth of work total on Smith's case.
Assuming that there are thirty days a month times six months, that would equal
180 days worth of work. Multiply that by the eight hours worked per day times
$350 an hour, equaling $504,000 for one attorney's efforts. All told, a
conservative estimate would equal $1,008,000 in attorney's fees. The real
amount is likely much higher. Finally, consider subsection (b), which allows
plaintiffs to seek punitive damages. How can a price be placed on the loss of
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time will tell if he and his lawyers believe they have a credible cause
of action against the government for their likely abuse. However,
any speculation as to recovery for victims of FISA abuse without
security clearances is extremely unlikely. Even though the
Legislature added a promising legal remedy for a wronged FISA
target to pursue, the courts promptly rendered it almost useless.
Nearly insurmountable immunities and factual requirements imposed
by the court would make many victims of FISA abuse throw up their
hands in despair. Many, if not all, of the targets of FISA surveillance
do not have the luxury of a security clearance, and would not have
the ability to argue that disclosure would not damage national
security. Therefore, as a remedy, the Legislature seems to have
failed to provide a workable and feasible remedy, both in the
criminal and civil arenas.
C. FISA Public Defenders
"[T]he United States has a difficult history which testifies to the
fact that in times of emergency and crisis, precisely at the time when
democracy is tested, there is a tendency to violate human rights
unnecessarily, a violation which is not rectified by the courts but
which is on occasion actually given effect, starting with Korematsu
and ending with the Patriot Act.
' 292
A basic search in the LEXIS database for law review articles
dealing with FISA produced more than two hundred entries. Of
those, approximately fifty were on topic. Most of the articles argued
that the amendments to FISA are unconstitutional,293 while very few
reputation, lost wages, marital and familial strife and likely harassment by the
media that the Smith family must have suffered? Again, conservatively, a
figure in the millions is not out of the question. Under 50 U.S.C. § 1828(1),
there is no way to know how many physical searches were conducted at the
Smith home or how many times the Smith's belongings were searched unless
the FISC application is disclosed. The same math would apply as above,
however, the total amount would be much less since it is likely that the
searches numbered in the range of dozens and not hundreds.
292. Emanuel Gross, The Influence of Terrorist Attacks on Human Rights in
the United States: The Aftermath of September 11, 2001, 28 N.C.J. INT'L L. &
COM. REG. 1, 78 (2002) (footnote omitted).
293. See, e.g., Jennifer C. Evans, Hijacking Civil Liberties: The USA Patriot
Act of 2001, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 933 (2002).
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argued that the changes withstood Fourth Amendment analysis.294
While many of the articles focused on the language of the
amendments and the accompanying case law, not one author offered
a solution to the inherent problems of FISA such as this paper
suggests.
The FISA application process itself must be fundamentally
altered to ensure the rights of U.S. citizens who are potential targets
of FISA surveillance. In order to ensure that all facts, both
inculpatory and exculpatory, are brought to the FISC's attention, this
Note proposes that Congress amend FISA to ban ex parte
applications, except in times of emergency. 295 Of course, this means
that we need government attorneys whose sole job would be to
review and argue against a FISA application if it lacks probable
cause to believe the target is an "agent of a foreign power."
296
Since all solutions to problems involve money, let us engage in
some hypothetical hiring. Let us assume that the number of FISA
applications for 2005 totals 2,000 applications. Of those
applications, assume that seventy-five percent of those are either
targeting foreign powers or reapplying for continuing surveillance.
That leaves us with 500 applications remaining of U.S. citizens. If
we also assume that there are 260 working days per year, that means
that each day, only two applications and accompanying evidence
need be reviewed. A team of three or four attorneys, along with a
support staffer for each, would easily meet the burden of reviewing
the applications.
This is hardly difficult in terms of money and logistics. The
added expense of three or four attorneys and support staff would be
294. See, e.g., Lance Davis, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court's
May 17 Opinion: Maintaining a Reasonable Balance Between National
Security and Privacy Interests, 34 MCGEORGE L. REv. 713 (2003).
295. Of course, the emergency exception should be written so that only valid
emergencies would be allowed under the statutes. For example, if in the
course of a terrorist investigation it becomes apparent that an attack is
imminent, and the FBI reasonably believes it can gain invaluable information
by surveilling a particular group of people using electronics to communicate,
the author has no problem allowing that type of surveillance to occur.
However, as in Smith, it was apparent that the documents had already been
purloined and that no information was continually flowing from Smith to
Leung.
296. See supra note 288 and accompanying text.
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negligible in the entire Federal Public Defenders' Office budget, and
security clearances for employees should be relatively easy to
procure. Existing Public Defender's Offices could be restructured to
have a secure floor with a SCIF for the accompanying classified
information and applications. In addition to adding a layer of
adversarial process for targets of surveillance, it would actually
improve FBI investigations since it would force FBI Agents to plan
out their investigations, allowing them prepare a more thorough
affidavit for a FISA warrant.
Targets could rest easy knowing that someone is advocating and
reviewing their Fourth Amendment rights. District Courts could be
relieved of much of the burden from FISA suppression motions
litigation regarding the validity of the FISA applications and
government mistake or misconduct. Since FISA public defenders
would have to argue truthfully before FISC, and since they would
have to present all evidence against the approval of a FISA
application or bring exculpatory evidence to FISC regarding an
existing FISA application, targets could be assured that the warrant
was vigorously litigated and tested. A federal judge would receive all
of the facts, not just the ones beneficial to the government's case.
The Fourth Amendment would be alive and well-even in the
foreign intelligence arena. The government could be confident
knowing that the additional safeguards pose no threat to national
security, and government investigations would not be seriously
hampered by unreasonable restrictions on agents' investigative
powers in times of emergency.
Critics of this proposal may argue that exposure of classified
intelligence gathering methods and classified materials would
seriously endanger national security. However, there is a direct
precedent for such a process that has existed for years that has
balanced the need for national security against defendants' access to
classified materials. Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice
("UCMJ"), classified information is directly defined in the opening
section.297 Military courts-martial are designed to try defendants who
297. "The term 'classified information' means (A) any information or
material that has been determined by an official of the United States pursuant
to law, an Executive order, or regulation to require protection against
unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national security, and (B) any restricted
data, as defined in section 11 (y) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C.
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are accused of spying 298 or who engaged in espionage. 2 99 Naturally,
these charges often involve matters of the highest national security
since they may deal with classified information regarding, among
other topics: nuclear weaponry, military spacecraft and satellites,
early warning systems, war plans, and communications
intelligence. 30 These charges may also involve many different
forms of information storage or transmission.
301
In these cases, both attorneys need to know the background and
extent of the charges against the accused. Thus, military courts-
martial provide a system currently in place that deals specifically
with the production of classified information. Under the Military
Rule of Evidence ("M.R.E.") 505(a), a privilege against the
disclosure of classified materials exists at all stages of the
proceedings. 302  The M.R.E. specifically states that the person
claiming the privilege may authorize a witness or trial counsel to
2014(y))." 10 U.S.C. § 801(15) (2005).
298. Id. § 906.
299. Id. § 906(a)(1).
300. The specific language of the act reads:
Any person subject to this chapter [10 USCS §§ 801 et seq.] who, with
intent or reason to believe that it is to be used to the injury of the
United States or to the advantage of a foreign nation, communicates,
delivers, or transmits, or attempts to communicate, deliver, or
transmit, to any entity described in paragraph (2), either directly or
indirectly, anything described in paragraph (3) shall be punished as a
court-martial may direct, except that if the accused is found guilty of
an offense that directly concerns (A) nuclear weaponry, military
spacecraft or satellites, early warning systems, or other means of
defense or retaliation against large scale attack, (B) war plans, (C)
communications intelligence or cryptographic information, or (D) any
other major weapons system or major element of defense strategy, the
accused shall be punished by death or such other punishment as a
court-martial may direct.
Id. § 906(a)(1).
301. "A thing referred to in paragraph (1) is a document, writing, code book,
signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map,
model, note, instrument, appliance, or information relating to the national
defense." Id. § 906(a)(3).
302. "Classified information is privileged from disclosure if disclosure
would be detrimental to the national security. As with other rules of privilege
this rule applies to all stages of the proceedings." MIL. R. EVID. 505(a).
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assert the privilege on his behalf.
30 3
However, the M.R.E. does not specifically state that only the
prosecuting attorney may assert the privilege. When the accused
requests access to the classified materials prior to the beginning of
trial, and counsel asserts the privilege against disclosure, the
convening authority may, among other options, 304 "[p]rovide the
document subject to conditions that will guard against the
compromise of the information disclosed to the accused .... ,305 If
the privilege has been asserted with respect to "classified information
that apparently contains evidence that is relevant and necessary ...
and is otherwise admissible in evidence ... the matter shall be
reported to the convening authority."
30 6
If the information is not provided to the court-martial within a
reasonable time and proceeding with the case without such
information would materially prejudice a substantial right of the
accused, the military judge shall dismiss the charges to which the
classified information specifically relates.30 7
If the government agrees to disclose the information to the
accused, the military judge is required to draft a protective order,
30 8
303. Id. R. 505(c).
304. Rule 505(d) provides that:
Prior to referral of charges, the convening authority shall respond in
writing to a request by the accused for classified information if the
privilege in this rule is claimed for such information. The convening
authority may:
(1) Delete specified items of classified information from
documents made available to the accused;
(2) Substitute a portion or summary of the information for such
classified documents;
(3) Substitute a statement admitting relevant facts that the classified
information would tend to prove;
(4) Provide the document subject to conditions that will guard against
the compromise of the information disclosed to the accused; or
(5) Withhold disclosure if actions under (1) through (4) cannot be
taken without causing identifiable damage to the national security.
Id. R. 505(d).
305. Id. R. 505(d)(4).
306. Id. R. 505(f).
307. Id. R. 505(f)(4).
308. Id. R. 505(g).
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which may include the authorization of specific information by the
judge,30 9 specific storage procedures, 310 controlling access to the
material, 311 requiring security clearances, 312 requiring logs for all
who view the material,31 3 regulating notes taken from the classified
material 314 and assigning security personnel to the government
storage facilities.31 5
If the government does not wish to disclose the classified
material, the military judge is authorized to conduct an in camera
hearing to determine whether the information needs to be disclosed
to secure the rights of the accused.316  During the hearing,
"[c]lassified information is not subject to disclosure ... unless the
information is relevant and necessary to an element of the offense or
a legally cognizable defense and is otherwise admissible in
evidence." 31 7 If the judge finds that disclosure is warranted, and the
government continues to object, the judge may, among other options,
dismiss all charges.
318
Criticism of this article's proposal is blunted by the existence of
these procedures, especially in light of the fact that they have existed
since 1957. Under these procedures, both the prosecuting and
defense counsel have the opportunity to request and review classified
materials in order to protect both the interests of the government in
protecting national security and the interest of securing a fair trial
against the accused. These procedures have been in place for forty-
eight years, and there has been no outcry over potential damage to
national security, and the information potentially disclosed under
these procedures is much more sensitive than surveillance techniques
or information intercepted using these techniques.
309. Id. R. 505(g)(1)(A).
310. Id. R. 505(g)(1)(B).
311. Id. R. 505(g)(1)(C).
312. Id. R. 505(g)(1)(D).
313. Id. R. 505(g)(1)(E).
314. Id. R. 505 (g)(1)(F).
315. Id. R. 505(g)(1)(G).
316. Id. R. 505(i).
317. Id. R. 505(i)(4)(B).
318. Id. R. 505(f).
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V. CONCLUSION
The current debate over the Patriot Act's effect on FISA must
include its effects on real cases and on real people. The changes
made to FISA mean that defendants are easily ensnared in criminal
investigations through the secret surveillance of every corner of their
lives. Defendants have no remedy, either while undergoing
prosecution or after the case concludes. This paper has endeavored
to show the devastating impact FISA can have on defendants and to
show how the government uses this incredibly broad tool to pursue
criminal convictions.
James Smith, a veteran of the Armed Forces and a dedicated
thirty-year Special Agent and Supervisory Agent of the FBI, fell prey
to an Executive Branch run amok. In its zeal to ensure that Smith
was not another Robert Hanssen or Aldrich Ames, the government
violated his and his family's Fourth Amendment rights. Using a
constitutionally questionable statute, a secret court, and information
possibly gathered through a constitutionally questionable NSA
domestic spying program, the FBI was able to invade every aspect of
Smith's life. Ultimately, the FBI ruined Smith's reputation as a
defender of the United States and likely destroyed his familial
relationships, all without giving Smith a chance to defend the claims
against him. The government's victory is a guilty plea to a single
charge of lying to a federal officer about an affair and Smith's
resulting probation and three-month house arrest.
Smith's sentence means more than restrictions placed on a felon.
He will likely never work again in any meaningful capacity, and his
talent and experience as a veteran counterintelligence officer will be
wasted. He has likely lost many of his friends and family members'
respect, and his name will likely be used on Capitol Hill as political
fodder, showing Congress that the FBI can police their own.
The pulse of the Fourth Amendment is thready at best. Congress
has allowed the Executive Branch to take the events of September
11, 2001, and steamroll the protections of the Fourth Amendment.
Targets of surveillance cannot examine the underlying probable
cause forming the basis for the invasion of the most private aspects
of their lives. The lawyers for the defendants cannot see the
government's applications to examine them for proper probable
cause, and the judges do not get to ensure that the rights of the
defendants were not abused in the application process. The
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Executive Branch holds all of the cards and is never held accountable
for mistakes or misconduct at any point during or after the FISA
application process.
Criminal and civil remedies are completely ineffective due to
the Executive Branch's immunity from prosecution or lawsuit. Even
that rare exception, such as Smith, has an uphill battle ahead of him
should he decide to sue to recover the losses he and his family
suffered. Congress' oversight fails to protect the rights of U.S
citizens under the Fourth Amendment. Further, unlike Smith,
citizens without security clearances have even more limited ability to
argue that national security will not be damaged if the applications
are produced, even in camera.
The only way to guarantee protection of U.S. citizens' Fourth
Amendment rights is by ensuring that each FISA application
involving U.S. citizens is subjected to vigorous litigation through the
adversarial process. To this end, a small group of dedicated and
objective individuals whose sole mission is the protection of U.S.
citizens could be created through the Federal Public Defenders'
Office. For forty-eight years, this country has maintained a system
under which both sides in a court-martial can obtain access to
classified materials so that crimes involving such materials can be
adequately litigated. If it is good enough for the military and has
withstood the test of time, why should U.S. citizens not have the
same protections in the FISA context?
Without oversight of FISA applications, the Fourth Amendment,
a bedrock principle of the Bill of Rights, is in danger of becoming
obsolete in the context of FISA. If Smith cannot prevail in federal
court in a civil lawsuit, then we will have lost a powerful deterrent to
secret invasions of our private lives, and our government will have
become the thing we fear the most: an enemy of freedom.
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